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I. INTRODUCTION
Conflict of laws issues arise when more than one jurisdiction is
connected, in the legal sense, with the transaction or occurrence
which is the subject of litigation. 2 Such cases require resolution of
the conflict of laws issues to identify the rules of decision to be
applied to the adjudication on the merits.' Each state has its own
conflict rules that determine the extent to which the laws of other
jurisdictions will be given effect in cases brought before its courts.4
Conflict of laws analysis serves to fix the substantive rights of
parties, but the law of the forum state governs all remedial and
procedural questions.5 However, the distinction between substance
and procedure differs from state to state, and alone provides con-
siderable potential for confusion in the adjudication of cases in-
volving conflict of laws issues. 6 For this reason, the conscientious
practitioner must investigate local rules of substance and procedure,
as well as the rules governing conflict of laws resolution, when lit-
igating in an unfamiliar forum.
The complexity and confusion inherent to all conflict of laws
problems may be significantly exacerbated when a contract is the
subject of dispute. By virtue of the nature of contracts, it is possible
for several jurisdictions to be legally connected to the contractual
2. See generally, 4A Micnmas JuR. Conflict of Laws § 2 (1983); RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF
CoNrCT OF LAWS § 1 (1971).
3. 4A MIcrrms JR., supra note 2; RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 2.
4. 4A MicarEs Jum., supra note 2; RESTATEMENT, supra note 2.
5. Forney v. Morrison, 144 W. Va. 722, 110 S.E.2d 840 (1959); Tice v. E. I. DuPont de
Nemours & Co., 144 W. Va. 24, 106 S.E.2d 107 (1958); Saena v. Zenith Optical Co., 135 W. Va.
795, 65 S.E.2d 205 (1951). See also R. J. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS §
3.2 (3d ed. 1986); R. A. LEFLAR, TAE LAW OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 60, 121 (1959); 4A MIcHIEs
JuR., supra note 2, § 20.
6. LEFLAR, supra note 5, §§ 58, 60-69. Although an extensive discourse on the substantive-
procedural distinction is beyond the scope of the present discussion, it may prove helpful to the reader
to be made cognizant of the various issues on which the distinction may become blurred:
Numerous rules of local law give rise to the substance-procedure problem of characterization.
Rules concerning sufficiency of evidence to sustain a jury verdict, the necessity for jury
trial, joinder or misjoinder of parties, statutes of limitation, measure of damages, the statute
of frauds, the parol evidence rule, rules as to burden of proof, conditions to the maintenance
of actions, the allowance of off-sets and counterclaims, and various other rules, are all of
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relationship. A single contract may give rise to several legal ques-
tions, each of which might be controlled by the law of a different
state:
[c]apacity of the parties to contract, possible illegality of provisions in the con-
tract, the effect of illegality of a single provision on the contract as a whole,
interpretation of the contract, what acts will constitute performance, or breach,
what measure of damages will be allowed for non-performance, what procedural
rules must be followed in instituting and maintaining an action on the contract-
all these questions and more may be presented in a suit on one contract, and it
is possible that the same state's laws should not be controlling on every question.7
A single employment contract may also present multiple conflict
of laws issues. An employment contract may be negotiated in one
or several places, be executed in another location, and require per-
formance in yet another place or number of places. Consequently,
a dispute involving such a contract would require a choice of the
laws of the several jurisdictions in which the series of transactions
occurred.
At least two societal factors may contribute to an increase in the
frequency with which employment contract disputes will involve con-
flict of laws issues. One factor is the increasing mobility of the work
force. The second factor, inextricably related to the first, is the
growing number of employers whose businesses are of an interstate
or international character.
Additionally, recent developments in employment law may also
contribute to a rise in the number of cases requiring conflict of laws
resolution. In particular, the expanding willingness of the courts to
find enforceable contracts in non-traditional documents and em-
ployer representations8 can be anticipated to result in a significant
7. Id. at 229.
8. The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals first adopted a more liberal view of em-
ployment contracts in Cook v. Heck's. Inc., 342 S.E.2d 453 (W. Va. 1986). In Cook, the Court held
that the provisions of an employee handbook may form the basis of a unilateral contract that alters
the at-will nature of employment. Id. at 454.
In a later case, the Court indicated its willingness to subject an employer's oral representations
to the rule laid down in Cook. Collins v. Elkay Mining Co., 371 S.E.2d 46 (,V. Va. 1988). In Collins,
a terminated employee predicated his breach of contract claim on alleged oral representations of the
employer, as well as company publications. Id. The West Virginia Supreme Court reversed the circuit
court's dismissal of the claim, and remanded the case "to permit the plaintiff to proceed on the
contract claim in whatever manner he may believe proper. . . ." Id. at 52 (emphasis added).
1990]
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increase in the amount of employment contract litigation. 9 A pre-
dictable consequence of this increase in litigation is a corresponding
rise in the number of cases in which conflict of laws issues will be
confronted. Consequently, familiarity with conflict of laws analysis
may become increasingly necessary to the successful practice of em-
ployment law.
This article will attempt to disentangle the web of West Virginia
conflict law as it relates to employment contract disputes. By tracing
the various rules that have evolved in this area, this discussion will
focus on the policies and circumstances that may trigger the op-
eration of any one of the rules in preference to the others. Second,
this article will critically analyze the holdings of two recent West
Virginia cases 0 which addressed conflict issues in the context of
employment contracts. Finally, a cogent statement of the best rule
will be proposed.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF CONTRACT CONFLICT LAW
The myriad of potential legal questions that could arise from a
single contract presents an imposing list of possible conflict of laws
issues." Fortunately, this unmanageable array may be pragmatically
conceptualized as representative of only two broad categories: (1)
matters bearing on the making of a contract; and (2) matters bearing
on the performance of a contract. In fact, as the following discussion
will reveal, choice of law decisions frequently depend upon the char-
acterization of disputed issues in reference to these two categories.
Consequently, this section will first explore some of the consider-
ations inherent to this characterization.
The second goal of this section is to present the variety of rules
that have emerged from the development of contract conflict law,
as well as the exceptions thereto. It will become apparent that a
9. See, e.g., E. Robins, Unfair Dismissal; Emerging Issues in the Use of Arbitration as a
Dispute Resolution Alternative for the Nonunion Workforce, XII FORDHAM URB. L. J. 437 (1983-
84) (noting the substantial increase in employment litigation resulting from recent doctrinal changes,
and suggesting arbitration as a means of relieving the burden on the courts).
10. New v. TAC & C Energy, Inc., 355 S.E.2d 629 fV. Va. 1987); Jones v. Tri-County Growers,
366 S.E.2d 726 (W. Va. 1988).
I1. See, e.g., the list suggested by LaFLaR, supra note 6 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 92
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single jurisdiction may adopt all of the rules coextensively, such that
they may be used as alternative means of analysis. Such coexistence
of rules is necessary because, in any given case, circumstances which
invoke an exception to the preferred rule may provide the very sit-
uation that signals the operation of one of the others. This discussion
will survey the three most prevalent conflict rules, which are those
based upon (1) the intent of the parties; (2) the most significant
relationship theory; and (3) the "lex loci," or law of the place.
Finally, this section will discuss the application of state conflict of
laws rules to cases adjudicated in federal courts.
A. Primary Considerations of Conflict of Laws Analysis
1. Issues Inherent to the Making of a Contract
One of the first considerations in contract litigation is whether
a contract was indeed made. It is generally agreed that a contract
is made at the time and place where the final act necessary to create
a legal obligation is done. 12 Typically, a contract is made at the time
and place from which the acceptance of an offer is tendered. 3
However, the mere acceptance of an offer may not be sufficient
to create a binding obligation. The execution of a contract also must
satisfy the requirements of formal validity. Formal validity refers
to the necessary compliance with the forms and ceremonies pre-
scribed by law upon entering into contracts. 4 If the law of a state
makes certain forms and ceremonies essential to the validity of con-
tracts sought to be executed there, no contract is ever made by
transactions lacking in those formal requirements. 5 Consequently,
such law, sometimes called the lex loci celebrationis, necessarily gov-
12. See, e.g., Tow v. Miners Memorial Hosp. Ass'n, Inc., 305 F.2d 73 (4th Cir. 1962); General
Electric Co. v. Keyser, 166 W. Va. 456, 275 S.E.2d 289 (1981); Michigan Nat'l Bank v. Mattingly,
158 W. Va. 621, 212 S.E.2d 754 (1975); State v. Knapp, 147 W. Va. 704, 131 S.E.2d 81 (1963); Holt
Motors v. Casto, 136 W. Va. 284, 67 S.E.2d 432 (1951); Wick v. Dawson, 42 W. Va. 43, 24 S.E.
586 (1896). See generally 4A Mc-ms JuR., supra note 2, § 20 (1983); LEaAIR, supra note 5, § 122
(1959).
13. Knapp, 147 W. Va. at 704, 131 S.E.2d at 81; 4A Micmas JuR., supra note 2 § 20.
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erns the inchoate execution of any contract.16 Therefore, the initial
inquiry on all contract conflict of laws questions must be whether
or not a contract was made, according to the lex loci celebrationis.
7
Assuming that the formal validity of a contract can be estab-
lished, conflict of laws analysis may present other questions relevant
to the making of the contract. These questions typically focus on
the validity, construction, and interpretation of the contract. 8
A validity question arises when a contract provision is invalid
under the law of one of the states related to the transaction, but
enforceable under the law of another state related to the transac-
tion.19 The intent of the parties can be ascertained with respect to
the provision, but one state would refuse to give effect to that intent.
In such cases, the enforceability of the provision in question depends
on which law is chosen by the forum to govern the validity of the
contract. 20 A problem of construction arises when the intention of
the parties is not known and cannot be ascertained. 2' This requires
the court to decide the proper construction of the contractual pro-
vision in question. When the states related to the contract would
attribute different constructions to the provision, the resolution of
a contract dispute may depend entirely upon the law chosen to gov-
ern issues of construction.
Interpretation involves the process of discovering and giving ef-
fect to the actual intention of the parties, which most states will
enforce if valid.22 Because only the intention of the parties is at
issue, interpretation per se does not present a conflict of laws prob-
16. Holt Motors v. Casto, 136 W. Va. 284, 289 67 S.E.2d 432, 435 (1951).
17. 4A MICHIES JUR., supra note 2, § 21.
This initial inquiry must determine whether a failure to comply with a requirement of the lex
loci celebrationis, where such noncompliance has occurred, would render the contract void or unen-
forceable there. A contract void in the loci celebrationis is void everywhere. If, however, a contract
is merely rendered unenforceable by the lex loci celebrationis, it is only unenforceable in the courts
of that state, and may be sued upon elsewhere. Id.
18. Hereinafter, simply "validity," as "formal validity" will be expressly employed where such
is intended.
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lem. 2 However, conflict of laws problems can arise concerning the
rules governing the determination of the intention of the parties,
such as the admissibility of evidence. 24
2. Issues Inherent to the Performance of a Contract
The issues relating to the performance of a contract are difficult
to delineate by concise categorization. Performance certainly en-
compasses such considerations as the acceptable mode of perform-
ance, but may also include questions of what constitutes termination,
breach, recission, repudiation, default, and excuse for non-perform-
ance. 25 Additionally, the measure of damages for breach is consid-
ered by a majority of jurisdictions to be an issue of performance. 6
The majority rule is premised on the theory that the award of dam-
ages is a legal substitute for the performance due under the con-
tract. 27
The distinction between matters bearing on the making of a con-
tract and the performance of a contract can become obscured. For
example, the existence of a breach may depend on the construction
given to the contractual terms.28 In any event, the importance of
characterizing such issues will vary, depending on the particular con-
flict of laws rule employed by the court.
B. Rules for Resolving Conflict of Laws Issues
1. Intent of the Parties
Aside from formal validity, "it is said that the true test for the
determination of the proper law of a contract is the intent of the
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Annotation, What Law Governs in Determining Whether Facts and Circumstances Operate
to Terminate, Breach, Rescind, or Repudiate a Contract, 50 A.L.R.2d 254 (1956); E. G. LoRENZEN,
supra note 1, at 315.
26. Annotation, Conflict of Laws as to Elements and Measure of Damages Recoverable for
Breach of Contract, 50 A.L.R.2d 227, § 7 (1956); LEagAR, supra note 5, § 129.
A minority of jurisdictions view the measure of damages as remedial, and thus subject to the
laws of the forum. LELAR, supra note 5, § 129.
27. Id.
28. Annotation, supra note 25.
1990]
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parties and this intent, whether express or implied, will always be
given effect except under exceptional circumstances .... "29 The
concept that the parties may intend to contract with respect to the
laws of a particular place, and that their intent should be given
effect, sometimes is called the "party autonomy" theory. 0 This the-
ory was espoused early in our judicial history by Chief Justice Mar-
shall, who hailed as a tenet of universal law "the principle 'that in
every forum a contract is governed by the law with a view to which
it was made . "',31
The parties to a contract may expressly indicate their intent by
inclusion of a choice of law provision in the contract. 32 Where no
express indication of intent appears, some courts will apply the pre-
sumed intent of the parties to the resolution of the conflict of laws
issue.3 3 As the analysis of these two rules of intent differ signifi-
cantly, each will be considered in turn.
a. Express Intent - Choice of Law Provisions
A choice of law provision, or clause, as the name implies, is a
provision included in a contract by which the parties expressly stip-
ulate that the contract is to be governed by the law of a particular
place. As such, a choice of law provision designates the lex loci
solutionis, meaning the law of the place of solution.3 4 In other words,
the lex loci solutionis is the law in reference to which the parties
entered the contract and intended the contract to be governed.
35
One question frequently encountered in regard to choice of law
provisions is whether, and under what circumstances, such clauses
29. 4A MicHmis JuR., supra note 2, § 22. See also Annotation, Validity and Effect of Stip-
ulation in Contract to Effect that It Shall be Governed by the Law of a Particular State Which is
Neither Place Where Contract is Made Nor Place Where It is to Be Performed, 16 A.L.R.4th 967
(1982).
30. WEiN~T, supra note 5, § 7.3C.
31. Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 48 (1825).
32. WE NTRAuB, supra note 5, § 7.3C.
33. LELAa, supra note 5, § 123.
34. Davidson v. Browning, 73 W. Va. 276, 80 S.E. 363 (1913); 4A MicinS JUR., supra note
2, § 22.
35. Davidson, 73 W. Va. at 280, 80 S.E. at 365; 4A MicHms JUR., supra note 2, § 22.
[Vol. 92
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should be given effect.16 Section 187(2) of the Restatement (Second)
of Conflict of Laws (1971) explicitly addresses the applicability of
choice of law provisions:
(2) The law of the state chosen by the parties to govern their contractual rights
and duties will be applied, even if the particular issue is one which the parties
could not have resolved by an explicit provision in their agreement directed to
that issue, unless either
(a) the chosen state has no substantial relationship to the parties or the transaction,
and there is no other reasonable basis for the parties' choice, or
(b) application of the law of the chosen state would be contrary to a fundamental
public policy of a state which has a materially greater interest than the chosen
state in the determination of the particular issue and which, under the rule of §
188, would be the state of the applicable law in the absence of an effective choice
of law by the parties. 7
This section supports the general premise that choice of law pro-
visions should be deemed valid, except under "exceptional circum-
stances." 8
Judicial acceptance of the validity of choice of law provisions
may be intuitively pleasing for several reasons. From the standpoint
of the parties, giving effect to choice of law clauses would promote
the predictability of transactions.3 9 On the side of judicial efficiency,
one might argue that the acceptance of choice of law provisions
could enable courts to avoid the cumbersome analysis frequently
encountered in conflict of laws problems.4°
36. See, e.g., General Electric Co. v. Keyser, 166 W. Va. 456, 275 S.E.2d 289 (1981).
37. REsTATEMENT, supra note 2, section 187. Section 188 of the Second Restatement, cited in
the text of section 187, addresses the most significant relationship theory of conflict of laws resolution.
This theory will be considered later in this discussion. The citation does illustrate a point made
previously in this discussion; that is, that the various rules are often applied as alternatives of one
another.
38. Annotation, supra note 28 and accompanying text. The section articulates those circum-
stances that will be deemed "exceptional."
39. This has been deemed particularly important in business transactions. See, e.g., Scherk v.
Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 516 (1974).
40. Arguably, a court cannot avoid such analysis even if the parties have included a choice of
law provision in their contract. This conclusion is suggested by a close reading of subsection (2)(b),
of section 187 of the Second Restatement. Subsection (2)(b) provides that the choice of law of the
parties will not be applied if it would violate a public policy of the state whose laws would be chosen
to govern under § 188 in the absence of a choice of law provision. That is, if the chosen law would
contravene a public policy of the state with the most significant relationship to the transaction, it
should not be applied. Of course, in order to determine if such a policy would be violated, the court
would have to determine which state has the most significant relationship. Consequently, the court
is not able, with the benefit of a choice of law provision, to avoid altogether the analysis which is
often deemed so confusing.
9
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Despite the intuitive appeal of choice of law provisions, their
acceptance, as well as the underlying intent theory itself, has been
widely criticized. 41 Professor Lorenzen, one of this century's leading
conflict scholars, voiced the typical rejection of the theory:
So far as it applies to the validity of contract, the intention theory does not admit
of a theoretic defense, The validity or invalidity of a legal transaction should
result from fixed rules of law which are binding upon the parties. Allowing the
parties to choose their law in this regard involves a delegation of sovereign power
to private individuals. . . . This is true though they may be restricted in their
choice to the law of the states with which the contract has a substantial con-
nection .42
Professor Cook, another noted commentator, counters the po-
sition taken by Lorenzen with the observation that if the parties,
by including a choice of law provision in their contract, do in fact
"legislate," they do so only for themselves; they do not seek to do
so for others.
43
The suggestion that choice of law provisions allow private leg-
islating has not been the only criticism of the party autonomy theory.
A more recent critic, Russell Weintraub, suggests that an obvious
difficulty with reliance on choice of law clauses is that the parties
may inadvertently choose a jurisdiction whose laws will partially or
completely invalidate the contract. 44 Comment (e) to section 187 of
the Second Restatement of Conflicts notes that such a stipulation
should be disregarded as obvious error, and the proper law chosen
by other means. This logical exception, suggests Weintraub, reveals
the basic weakness of the rule: "When fully translated, section 187
means that the parties' choice of law will be given effect if it selects
the validating law, but not if it selects the invalidating law." ' 45 This
observation suggests that choice of law provisions are little more
than surplusage, because the validating law will be applied whether
or not it is the law chosen by the parties. In other words, "[a] choice
41. See, e.g., J. Beale, What Law Governs the Validity of a Contract, 23 HARv. L. REV. 260
(1909); E. G. Lorenzen, Validity and Effects, of Contracts in the Conflict of Laws, 30 YAE L. J.
655 (1921); Win TRALm, supra note 5, § 7.3C.
42. Lorenzen, supra note 41, at 658.
43. W. W. CooK, THE LooxcAL AND LEOA BAsEs oF THE CoNnicT oF LAws 393 (1949).
44. WmENRAuB, supra note 5, § 7.2.
45. Id. at 373-74.
[Vol. 92
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of law clause, if it selects the validating law, simply says of the
other contract terms, 'and we really mean it!' ,46
Unfortunately, with respect to the inclusion in a contract of a
choice of law provision, both parties may not "really mean it."
Ordinarily, parties do not express their intent through choice of law
provisions. Such provisions are most likely to appear in contracts
prepared by large commercial parties.41 Choice of law clauses in such
contracts will usually reflect nothing more than the law most fa-
vorable to the interests of the party preparing the document. 48 The
problem with these choice of law provisions is that they lack the
feature of fair bargaining that is central to the party autonomy the-
ory. Accordingly, choice of law provisions that are contained in
adhesion contracts, prepared by the more powerful party for its own
advantage, should be disregarded as an expression of the actual in-
tent of both parties. 4
9
The foregoing criticisms notwithstanding, a majority of juris-
dictions at least pay lip service to the validity of law provisions. 0
West Virginia fits squarely within the majority. The effectiveness of
a choice of law provision was addressed by the West Virginia Su-
preme Court of Appeals for the first time in General Electric Co.
v. Keyser." The court, relying on section 187 of the Second Re-
statement of Conflicts, concluded that choice of law clauses are not
void per se, and will be enforced, subject to the exceptions artic-
ulated in the Restatement.5 2 One of the articulated exceptions arises
46. Id. at 374.
47. LEaLAR, supra note 5, § 123.
48. Id.
49. See comment (b) to section 187 of the R STATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1971)
which states that, when deciding whether to give effect to a choice of law provision, one factor the
forum court should consider is whether the clause is contained in an adhesion contract.
50. LEFLaR, supra note 5, § 123.
51. 166 W. Va. 456, 275 S.E.2d 289 (1981). However, in Kolendo v. Jarrell, Inc., 489 F. Supp.
983 (S.D.W. Va. 1980), decided one year previously by a federal district court applying West Virginia
law, it was concluded that West Virginia would enforce choice of law provisions, unless the selected
jurisdiction bore little or no relationship to the contract. The decision of the West Virginia Supreme
Court in General Electric confirms the Kolendo court's conclusion of what the West Virginia court
would do if a choice of law provision came before it.
52. 166 W. Va. at 462, 275 S.E.2d at 293. The Court also noted that W. VA. CODE § 46-1-
105(2) sanctions the use of choice of law provisions in commercial transactions. Id. at 461 n.2, 275
S.E.2d at 292 n.2.
1990]
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when the jurisdiction chosen bears no substantial relationship to the
parties or the transaction.53 Because the court found that the ju-
risdiction chosen in General Electric-New York-had no relation-
ship to the contract, it declined to enforce the choice of law
provision.1
4
Since General Electric, the West Virginia Supreme Court has
thrice addressed choice of law provisions in contract actions.5 Those
occasions provided the court with the opportunity to reiterate the
rule adopted in General Electric. Consequently, it appears well set-
tled that in West Virginia, choice of law provisions will be enforced,
unless either the jurisdiction chosen has no substantial relationship
to the transaction, or the law chosen would violate the public policy
of the state whose laws would apply absent such a clause.
b. Implied or Presumed Intent
Even when a contract is silent with respect to the parties' in-
tended choice of law, their intent nonetheless may be presumed and
given effect. The origin of this concept in Anglo-American law can
be traced to dictum by Lord Mansfield in the early case of Robinson
v. Bland:5
6
The law of the place can never be the rule, where the transaction is entered into
with an express view to the law of another country, as the rule by which it is
to be governed. Huberi Praelectiones, lib. 1 tit. 3 pa. 34 is clear and distinct:
'Veruntamen, etc. locus in quo contractus, etc. potius considerand, etc. se ob-
ligavit.'
37
The basic theory of the presumed intent rule, as stated by the
United States Supreme Court in the classic case of Pritchard v. Nor-
ton,58 is that "[t]he parties cannot be presumed to have contemplated
53. RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 187.
54. General Electric, 166 W. Va. at 465, 275 S.E.2d at 294. The only relationship that New
York had to the contract was that General Electric is incorporated under the laws of the State of
New York. The Court found this relationship to be too insubstantial to give effect to the provision
choosing New York law.
55. Lee v. Saliga, 373 S.E.2d 345 (V. Va. 1988); Oakes v. Oxygen Therapy Services, 363 S.E.2d
130 (%V. Va. 1987); Lee Enterprises v. Twentieth Century-Fox, 303 S.E.2d 702 (%V. Va. 1983).
56. 2 Burr. 1077 (K. B. 1760) cited in LoRENZEN, supra note 1, at 273.
57. Id.
58. 106 U.S. 124 (1882).
[Vol. 92
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a law which would defeat their engagements." 59 When, as in Prit-
chard, the contract at issue would be valid under the law of one
of the related states, but invalid under the law of the other, it is
presumed that the parties intended the contract to be governed by
the validating law. 60
The theory of presumed intent is subject to the same criticisms
as the express intent theory discussed in the previous subsection.
Additionally, Weintraub suggests that the doctrine is based on a
circumlocution of logic which simply means, "apply the law that
will validate the contract.' '61
Although no West Virginia cases have expressly adopted the pre-
sumed intent doctrine to resolve a conflict of laws issue, at least
two cases consider presumed intent in connection with other rules.
62
On both occasions, the West Virginia Supreme Court noted that the
lex loci rules63 follow from the presumed intent of the parties. 64 In
effect, the court credited presumed intent with providing the ra-
tionale for the choice of law rule articulated in both cases, but not
as a rule to be used in its own right to resolve the conflict of laws
problem.
2. Most Significant Relationship
A second, relatively new, approach to conflict of laws resolution
is the most significant relationship rule. The premise of this rule is
that, in the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties,
the law of the place with the most significant relationship to the
matter in dispute should govern. 65 This approach, which is also called
59. Id. at 137.
60. Id.
61. VEinTRAtu, supra note 5, § 7.3B at 368.
62. In re Fox's Estate, 131 W. Va. 429, 48 S.E.2d 1 (1948); Selected Kentucky Distillers, Inc.
v. Foloway, 124 W. Va. 72, 19 S.E.2d 94 (1942).
63. See infra n.77 and accompanying text.
64. In re Fox's Estate, 131 W. Va. 429, 48 S.E.2d 1 (1948); Kentucky Distillers, Inc. v. Foloway,
124 W. Va. 72, 19 S.E.2d 94 (1942).
65. WEiNTRA B, supra note 5, § 7.3D (3d ed. 1986); R. A. LEFLAR, THE LAW OF THE CONFLICT
OF LAWS § 125 (1959); Annotation, Conflict of Laws as to Elements and Measure of Damages Re-
coverable for Breach of Contract, 50 A.L.R.2d 227, 227[a] (1956).
The law of the state with the most significant relationship is said to govern in the absence of
an effective choice of law by the parties. When is a choice of law provision "effective"? According
to section 187(2)(b) of the Second Restatement, such a provision is effective when it does not violate
a public policy of the state with the most significant relationship!
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the "center of gravity" or "grouping of contacts" theory,6 6 is the
subject of section 188 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of
Laws (1971). Section 188 states that:
(1) The rights and duties of the parties with respect to an issue in contract are
determined by the local law of the state which, with respect to that issue, has
the most significant relationship to the transaction and the parties under the prin-
ciples stated in § 6.6
(2) In the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties (see § 187), the
contacts to be taken into account in applying the principles of § 6 to determine
the law applicable to an issue include:
(a) the place of contracting,
(b) the place of negotiation of the contract,
(c) the place of performance,
(d) the location of the subject matter of the contract, and
(e) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and pltace of busi-
ness of the parties. These contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative
importance with respect to the particular issue.
(3) If the place of negotiating the contract and the place of performance are in
the same state, the local law of this state will usually be applied, except as oth-
erwise provided in §§ 189-199 and 23.6
In his treatise, Professor Leflar praised the most significant re-
lationship theory for providing a rule which focuses on a matter
which can actually decide which law governs, as opposed to the "old
multiplicity of rules" which focus on facts whose effect is acci-
dental.69 Leflar offered this praise in spite of his observation that
"[t]here is no fixed guide to courts or parties for ascertaining what
state has the closest total relationship to the contract." 0 Of course,
Leflar's comments predated the publication of the Restatement (Sec-
66. LEaLAR, supra note 5, § 125.
67. Section 6(2) identifies the factors relevant to the choice of applicable law as
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems,
(b) the relevant policies of the forum,
(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interests of these states
in the determination of the particular issue,
(d) the protection of justified expectations,
(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law,
(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and
(g) ease in the determination and applicatioh of the law to be applied.
RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 6(2).
68. RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 188 (1971).
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ond) of Conflict of Laws (1971), which ostensibly provide the guid-
ance Leflar found wanting.
Interestingly, it is these very guidelines, or rather, the use made
of them, which has led to the most severe criticism of the most
significant relationship theory. The main thesis of this criticism is
that section 188 of the Second Restatement may extend an invitation
to replace critical, functional analysis with mere contact-counting.
71
According to Weintraub, "[i]t is the complete antithesis of func-
tional analysis to list any contacts as 'significant' a priori, without
first knowing the domestic law of the state having that contact and
the policies underlying that domestic law.' '72 When the most sig-
nificant relationship rule degenerates into contact-counting, other
aberrations are also fostered. The most notable of these is "contact
building." 3
The most significant relationship theory was considered, but not
applied by the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in General
Electric Co. v. Keyser.74 A survey of other contract conflict of laws
cases reveals that the West Virginia Supreme Court has frequently
relied on the most significant relationship theory, or a variant of
the theory, to determine exceptions to other conflict rules .7  How-
ever, the court has not applied this rule as often as the other rules
of resolution. 76 Consequently, the status of this rule in West Virginia
71. WEINTRAUB, supra note 5, § 7.3D. Weintraub speculates that this may be especially true
for the "judge or lawyer, not expert in conflicts theory and working under time pressures that prevent
scrutiny of the Second Restatement in all its detailed commentary on the black letter .... Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 380. Contact building may be best described as the practice whereby parties, in
anticipation of possible litigation, engage in conduct intended to artificially increase the number of
contacts with a favorable jurisdiction.
74. 166 W. Va. 456, 275 S.E.2d 289 (1981). However, as discussed previously, the Court did
consider the most significant relationship theory in the context of exceptions to the effectiveness of
choice of law provisions, Understanding this distinction is necessary to comprehend the analysis of
General Electric. The Court used the most significant relationship theory to determine that the choice
of law provision was ineffective, but not to determine which law should be applied. It so happens,
however, that in this case, the most significant relationship theory would have rendered the same
result.
75. Lee v. Saliga, 373 S.E.2d 345 (W. Va. 1988); Lee Enterprises v. Twentieth Century-Fox,
303 S.E.2d 702 (W. Va. 1983).
76. New v. TAC & C Energy, Inc., 355 S.E.2d 629 (W. Va. 1987), where the Court invoked
the "more significant relationship" exception to the designated conflict rule and then applied the law
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appears to be limited; it provides a last resort where the more pre-
ferred rules fail.
3. The Lex Loci Rule-The Law of the Place
The final rule to be considered in this section is the lex loci, or
law of the place, rule. This rule represents an attempt to fix the
rights of the parties based upon the determination of where specific
acts occurred. 77 Under this rule, contract disputes are governed by
the lex loci contractus, or law of the place of contract. 78
Considering the relative infrequency with which the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals has confronted conflict of laws issues,7 9
it borders on exaggeration to claim a "traditional" rule of reso-
lution. This disclaimer notwithstanding, the traditional favorite in
West Virginia contract conflict law is the lex loci contractus rule.80
Consequently, the conflict of laws analysis most frequently employed
in West Virginia contract disputes has focused on the determination
of the place of making and performance of the contract.
Perhaps the most concise form of the lex loci contractus rule is
that the law of the place in which the contract is made and per-
formed governs its validity, construction and operation.8' This rule
is generally subject to two qualifications: (1) that the parties have
not made a choice of law provision in the contract; and (2) that
of the state considered to have the most significant relationship to the adjudication of the case.
See also Oakes v. Oxygen Therapy Services, 363 S.E.2d 130 (W. Va. 1987) (where the Court
applied the most significant relationship rule for torts, found in section 145(1) of the RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws (1971), to determine the rule of decision for the case).
77. The conceptual basis for this rule can be found in the notions of territorial sovereignty
and that the right in a cause of action is vested by a place. These notions were prevalent at the time
of the first Restatement of Conflict of Laws, and were espoused by such noted justices as Holmes,
Hand and Cardozo. Interview with James McLaughlin, Professor of Law at West Virginia University
(Sept. 16, 1989).
78. Id.; Annotation, supra note 66.
79. The Court itself admitted this infrequency in General Electric, 166 W. Va. at 460, 275
S.E.2d 292.
80. Saliga, 373 S.E.2d at 351.
81. New, 355 S.E.2d at 631; Id.; General Electric, 166 W. Va. at 459-60, 275 S.E.2d at 291;
Michigan Nat'l Bank v. Mattingly, 158 W. Va. 621, 212 S.E.2d 754 (1975); State v. Knapp, 147 W.
Va. 704, 131 S.E.2d 81 (1963); In re Fox's Estate, 131 W. Va. 429, 48 S.E.2d 1 (1948); State v. Hall
& White Co., 91 W. Va. 648, 114 S.E. 250 (1922).
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the law identified by the analysis under the rule does not violate
West Virginia public policy.
8 2
Unfortunately, the most simple form of the lex loci contractus
rule is limited in application to those situations where the contract
is both made and performed in the same jurisdiction. 81 When a con-
tract is made in one state, but to be performed in another, a variant
of the basic rule must be applied. Under this variation of the lex
loci contractus rule, the law chosen to govern a contract that was
made and performed in different states would depend on whether
the disputed issue was one related to the making of the contract or
to the performance of the contract. The rule emerged that matters
bearing on the making of a contract, its nature, validity and con-
struction, are governed by the law of the place where the contract
was made, but that matters bearing on the performance of a contract
are governed by the law of the place in which the contract was to
be performed.8 4 It is apparent that under this rule, a contract action
in which issues of both validity or construction and performance
are disputed could require the court to apply the laws of more than
one state in order to render a final decision.
This dual application of laws was considered by the West Virginia
Supreme Court in Boyd v. Pancake Realty Co.85 In Boyd, a contract
made in West Virginia required the defendant to render performance
in Ohio.86 The court concluded that because the contract was made
in West Virginia, its nature, construction and validity must be de-
termined by West Virginia law.8 7 However, the court held that be-
cause the defendant's acts of performance were to be rendered in
Ohio, the law of Ohio must be applied to determine issues regarding
those acts.
8
82. Saliga, 373 S.E.2d at 351; State v. Hall & White Co., 91 W. Va. 648, 11.4 S.E. 250 (1922);
Wick v. Dawson, 42 W. Va. 43, 24 S.E. 587 (1896).
83. New, 355 S.E.2d at 630.
84. Jones v. Tri-County Growers, 366 S.E.2d 726 (V. Va. 1988); Boyd v. Pancake Realty Co.,
131 W. Va. 150, 45 S.E.2d 633 (1948); Klinck v. Price, 4 W. Va. 4 (1870); Tow v. Miners Memorial
Hosp. Ass'n, Inc., 305 F.2d 73 (4th Cir. 1962).
85. 131 W. Va. 150, 46 S.E.2d 633 (1948).
86. Id. at 152-53, 46 S.E.2d at 634-35.
87. Id. at 156, 46 S.E.2d at 636.
88. Id. at 156, 46 S.E.2d at 636-37. The defendant's performance was to be rendered in Ohio,
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The rule articulated in Boyd was later applied to the conflict of
laws problem presented in Tow v. Miners Memorial Hosp. Ass'n,
Inc.,89 a case before the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit. The Tow case not only illustrates the analysis utilized
in articulating the rule of Boyd, but provides an example of the
operation of the rule in the context of an employment contract dis-
pute as well.
The plaintiff in Tow was hired by a hospital owned by the de-
fendant corporation. The contract had been negotiated and executed
while the plaintiff was living in New York. In response to the plain-
tiff's inquiry, the defendant supplied information about the position
which stated: "Your employment will not be terminated except by
mutual consent or for just cause." 90 The plaintiff, having reviewed
the information, telephoned the defendant from New York and ac-
cepted the position. On the day of the acceptance, the defendant
sent the plaintiff a formal confirmation letter which did not refer
to the issue of tenure, but stated that a formal appointment letter
would be forthcoming. The formal appointment letter, received by
the plaintiff in New York, did not reiterate the tenure statement
contained in the original information, but stated that the plaintiff's
employment was "to remain in effect as long as you render satis-
factory service." 91 The plaintiff signed three copies of this letter and
returned them by mail to the defendant. The plaintiff subsequently
moved to Man, West Virginia, where he assumed his duties at the
defendant's hospital. When he was discharged eleven months later,
the plaintiff brought a breach of contract action, alleging that he
had been discharged without cause. The district court granted the
and the Court applied the law of Ohio only to determine those acts. The plaintiff's performance,
however, was rendered in West Virginia. The language of the Court's opinion suggests that had the
plaintiff's performance been in dispute, the law of West Virginia would have been dispositive. even
if the contract had not also been made there. Id. Consequently, a broad reading of Boyd also suggests
the rule to be applied when performance is rendered in more than one place: The law of the place
in which the specific acts complained of occurred (or should have occurred if non-performance Is
alleged) will govern the determination of those acts.
89. 305 F.2d 73 (4th Cir. 1962).
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defendant's motion for summary judgment and the plaintiff ap-
pealed.92
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the
lower court.93 The court first noted that West Virginia conflict law
must be applied to resolve the conflict of laws problem.94 The court
then stated that under West Virginia conflict law, the substantive
law of New York controlled the making of the contract, as well as
its nature, construction and validity, because the contract was made
binding in New York. 95 Because the performance of the contract
was rendered in West Virginia, however, the court held that the
performance was governed by the substantive law of West Virginia. 96
Applying this analysis, the court found that the formal appointment
letter, signed by the plaintiff, constituted the fully integrated con-
tract of the parties under New York law. Therefore, the terms of
the contract clearly allowed termination for unsatisfactory service.
Turning then to West Virginia law to determine performance by the
parties, the court found that when one contracts to perform services
to the satisfaction of another, such other is the sole judge of the
quality of work done, and has the absolute right to accept or reject
it.97 Therefore, the court held that the defendant's termination of
the plaintiff did not constitute a breach of the contract. 9
III. EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS: THE RuLEs OF NEw AND JONES
In two recent cases, New v. TAC & C Energy, Inc.99 and Jones
v. Tri-County Growers,100 the West Virginia Supreme Court of Ap-
peals specifically addressed the conflict of laws issue in the context
of employment contracts. While one might hope that New and Jones
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 75, where the court cites Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487
(1941), in support of its conclusion that West Virginia conflict law must be applied. The principle
of Klaxon will be more fully discussed in the next section of this article.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 76 citing Barrett v. Raleigh Coal & Coke Co., 51 W. Va. 416, 41 S.E. 220 (1902),
and Blue v. Hazel-Atlas Glass Co., 106 W. Va. 642, 147 S.E. 22 (1929).
98. Id.
99. 355 S.E.2d 629 (,V. Va. 1987).
100. 366 S.E.2d 726 (,V. Va. 1988).
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would articulate clear and consistent standards for conflict analysis,
one would be hoping for too much. A critical perusal of New and
Jones reveals an inter-decisional inconsistency which plunges the ar-
ticulated conflict rules into conflict with one another.
The dissonance of these two cases lends confusion to the already
murky area of conflict law, and could create even greater uncertainty
in the resolution of conflict problems. In this section, the decisions
of these two cases will be analyzed and compared in order to propose
the best statement of the current West Virginia rule.
A. New v. TAC & C Energy, Inc.: The Second Restatement
Position
In New v. TAC & C Energy, Inc.,t°0 the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals first addressed the conflict of laws question in
relation to an employment contract. The plaintiffs, a husband and
wife, were West Virginia residents who were hired by the defendant,
a West Virginia corporation, to work at a mining operation in Ken-
tucky. The plaintiffs alleged that at the time they were laid off by
the defendant, they were owed certain wages and benefits pursuant
to the terms of their employment. Accordingly, the plaintiffs brought
suit alleging a violation of W. Va. Code § 21-5-4(e) (1985), which
provides for recovery of overdue wages. 02 The Circuit Court of
Mingo County granted summary judgment to the defendant on the
101. 355 S.E.2d 629 (NV. Va. 1987). The opinion does not specify the exact nature of the contract
between the parties. The Court at one point refers to the "employment agreement," Id. at 630, and
later to the "contract," Id. at 630-31, but it is impossible to determine whether the contracts were
traditional documents, or contracts implied under the rule adopted in Cook v. Heck's, Inc., 342
S.E.2d 453 (W. Va. 1986). Another possibility is that the Court uses "contract" in the broad sense
to refer to the agreement to render services in return for wages, not to imply an alteration in the
at-will nature of the relationship.
102. The relevant portion of section 21-5-4(e) states:
If a person, firm or corporation fails to pay an employee wages as required under this
section, such person, firm or corporation shall, in addition to the amount due, be liable
to the employee for liquidated damages in the amount of wages at his regular rate for each
day the employer is in default, until he is paid in full, without rendering any services
therefore: Provided, however, that he shall cease to draw such wages thirty days after such
default.
W. 'VA. CODE § 21-5-4(e) (1985).
[Vol. 92
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grounds that it lacked jurisdiction over a wage dispute arising in
Kentucky.103
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the lower
court. The court characterized the case as a contract dispute, and
the question presented on appeal as one of conflict of laws. The
facts relevant to the conflict of laws question, according to the court,
were that the employment contract was made in West Virginia, but
that the performance was rendered in both West Virginia and Ken-
tucky.
The court stated that it had not previously addressed a conflict
of laws question in the context of an employment contract, and
noted the paucity of West Virginia cases from which it could seek
guidance. The court cited In re Fox's Estate as the "closest case.'" °4
The plaintiffs in Fox claimed to have cared for an ailing relative
prior to her death in reliance on the relative's promise to provide
for them in her will. Upon discovering that the promise had not
been kept, the plaintiffs brought suit against the decedent's estate
to recover the value of their services. Both the decedent's promise
and the plaintiffs' services were rendered in West Virginia. Con-
sequently, in Fox the court, using the lex loci contractus rule, iden-
tified West Virginia law as the rule of decision. 05
Referring to the rule stated in Fox, the New court stated that
[t]he above case makes clear that if the contract [i.e., the News'] had been made
and performed totally in West Virginia, there would be no question about which
law to apply .... Because the test set out in Fox's Estate does not address the
situation where the performance and contracting are not in the same state, we
are left with no clear provision of law governing this situation.'16
103. New, 355 S.E.2d at 630.
104. 131 W. Va. 429, 48 S.E.2d 1 (1948). Syllabus point 2, quoted by the New Court, states:
"The laws of the state where a contract is made and to be performed determine the substantive rights
of the parties to such contract .... .
105. Id.
106. New, 355 S.E.2d at 630-31. The Court failed to find the rule of Boyd v. Pancake Realty
Co., 131 W. Va. 150, 45 S.E.2d 633 (1948), which was decided the same year as Fox's Estate. The
rule of Boyd was adopted by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Tow v. Miners Memorial Hosp.
Ass'n, Inc., 305 F.2d 73 (4th Cir. 1962).
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Upon concluding that it was without precedential guidance, the
court adopted the rule articulated in the Restatement (Second) of
Conflict of Laws § 196 (1971).107 That section provides that
[t]he validity of a contract for the rendition of services and the rights created
thereby are determined, in the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties,
by the local law of the state where the contract provides that the services, or a
major portion of the services, be rendered, unless with respect to the particular
issue, some other state has a more significant relationship under the principles
stated in § 6 to the transaction and the parties, in which event the local law of
the other state will be applied."'1
Having adopted this rule, the court applied West Virginia law
to the dispute. The court chose West Virginia law after finding that
West Virginia had a more significant relationship to the contract
than did Kentucky. This conclusion was predicated on the grounds
that both the plaintiffs and the defendant were residents of West
Virginia, the plaintiffs were only in Kentucky for the duration of
the job, the contract was made in West Virginia, and the contract
was performed in this state by the defendants.' °9
The rule adopted by the court in New is commendable for the
ease of analysis it affords in the resolution of conflict of laws prob-
lems. Its concise directives are well adapted to promote the principles
of certainty and predictability set forth in § 6(f) of the Second Re-
statement.110 Its full potential cannot be realized, however, if the
exceptions to its application, most notably the more significant re-
lationship exception, are read to give license to judicial overreaching.
Such is the flaw of New.
The New court's attempt to identify the state with the more
significant relationship to the contract issue before it is archetypical
of the contact-counting decried by Weintraub in his criticism of the
most significant relationship rule."' The court in New merely al-
lowed the enumeration of contacts to tip the scales of analysis with-
out regard to the weight due to each of those contacts.
107. Id.
108. New, 355 S.E.2d at 631.
109. Id. at 631.
110. RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 188 (1971).
111. WEINTRAUB, supra note 5, § 3.2B.
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The plaintiffs in New brought suit to recover wages alleged to
have been due for work performed at the defendant's mine. This
was the only issue in the case. Therefore, the contacts relevant to
this issue are certainly entitled to more weight in balance of sig-
nificance than are contacts with other factors in the contract.
The Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 196 states that
the law of the place where the services are to be rendered should
govern unless, "with respect to the particular issue, some other state
has a more significant relationship" (emphasis added).112 This state-
ment is similar to that in section 188 of the Second Restatement,
which articulates the most significant relationship rule."' Section 188
states that "[t]he rights and duties ... with respect to an issue in
contract are determined by the local law of the state which, with
respect to that issue, has the most significant relationship . .. " (em-
phasis added).1 4 The unambiguous intent of section 188 was to pre-
vent the most significant relationship rule from deteriorating into d
test of sheer numbers. It is a rule of quality, not just quantity.
Applying the most significant relationship rule to the facts of
New," 5 it becomes apparent that Kentucky, not West Virginia, had
the more significant relationship to the disputed issue. The work
which entitled the plaintiffs to wages due was performed entirely in
Kentucky." 6 The plaintiffs' paychecks were delivered to the mine
site in Kentucky." 7 Additionally, based upon these considerations,
it seems clear that Kentucky had the most significant relationship
to the particular issue of the case, that is, the wage dispute.
In its analysis of the facts, the New court stated that "admin-
istrative matters necessary to the employer's performance were per-
112. RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 196.
113. RESTATEBMENT, supra note 2, § 188.
114. Id.
115. The "more significant relationship" exception of section 196 should not be confused with
the "most significant relationship" rule of section 188. Section 196 does not require that the most
significant relationship rule be satisfied before the exception be invoked; the exception only requires
that another state have a more significant relationship. Nonetheless, the considerations for determining
the most significant relationship under section 188 are much the same as those used to determine if
another state has a more significant relationship under section 196.
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formed in West Virginia .. ."118 However, this fact is of less
importance to the analysis because the specific act of nonperform-
ance complained of, payment of wages, was to have been performed
in Kentucky. The work done by the plaintiffs gave rise, in a sense,
to a legal debt under their employment agreements. When a contract
specifies that a debt be paid to a specific party, at a specific place,
by a specific date, the place of performance of the contract is the
place where the payment is to be made.1 9 The place from which
the payment is dispatched is immaterial to the performance of the
contract. Accordingly, the defendant's act of non-performance of
wages occurred in Kentucky, not West Virginia. The fact that West
Virginia was the point of origin of these paychecks is irrelevant to
the issue of non-performance. 20
The court also stated that the plaintiffs were residents of West
Virginia who were "only in Kentucky for the duration of the job.' 2'
The "duration of the job," at least in the case of Mr. New, was over
two years. The passage of two years seems more than sufficient for
the plaintiffs to have established residency in Kentucky.'2 In any event,
they were apparently living in Kentucky at, and prior to, the time
that their cause of action arose. Their previous or subsequent residency
in West Virginia, therefore, seems to be less significant to the disputed
issue. In sum, the analysis by the court in New seems to be predicated
heavily upon the number of West Virginia contacts, and not the nature
of those contacts with respect to the disputed issue.
The most promising aspect of the decision in New is the court's
adoption of the Second Restatement rule for employment contract
conflict of laws resolution. The court's use of that rule, however, is
118. Id.
119. Wick v. Dawson, 42 W. Va. 43, 24 S.E. 587 (1896).
120. It would be interesting to discover where the defendant paid other benefits, such as un-
employment or workers compensation, on behalf of the plaintiffs. Were these paid to the state of
Kentucky or West Virginia?
121. New, 355 S.E.2d at 631.
122. This is assuming that the plaintiffs lived in Kentucky during their employment there. It
may, of course, be possible that the couple lived in West Virginia and commuted to their jobs at
the Kentucky mine. The expression "in Kentucky for the duration of the job," however, does not
lend itself to the latter interpretation.
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discouraging. In fact, the theme of New may be characterized as:
"Right Rule-Wrong Result."
B. Jones v. Tri-County Growers: Deja Vu?
In Jones v. Tri-County Growers,12 the West Virginia Supreme Court
of Appeals was confronted again with a conflict of laws problem
arising from the litigation of an employment contract. 12 The plaintiffs
in Jones were Jamaican nationals who were hired to pick fruit in the
Eastern Panhandle of West Virginia. The defendant orchardists pro-
cured the workforce through the provisions of a master contract ex-
ecuted in Jamaica with an agent of the Jamaican government.
Individual contracts were subsequently executed with the workers
hired. 2
The master contract in Jones included provisions for certain with-
holding and deductions to be taken from the workers' paychecks.
These included: deductions by the defendants for transportation ad-
vancements and five dollars per diem for meals, a three percent with-
holding to be paid to the Jamaican government for insurance premiums,
and a twenty-three percent withholding to be paid to the agent of the
Jamaican government for certain expenses. 126 None of the workers
executed wage withholding or assignment authorizations. 27
The plaintiffs brought suit to enforce the restrictions placed on
wage assignments under W. Va. Code § 21-5-3 (1979), and to recover
damages.' 21 The Circuit Court of Berkeley County dismissed the ac-
tion, holding that the master contract was substantially in compliance
with the statutory scheme, and the plaintiffs appealed. 129 On appeal,
the defendants argued that because the contract was executed in Ja-
maica, the law of Jamaica should govern the action. 30
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Contrary to the contention of the defendants, the Supreme Court
of West Virginia noted that the case involved performance of a con-
tract and that "[miatters bearing on the performance of a contract
are governed by the law of the place in which the contract is to be
performed. 131 Having thus stated the applicable choice of laws rule,
the Jones court then explained that
[a]lthough it is clear that contracts are governed by the law of the jurisdiction where
the contract is made, performance in another state that violates that state's public
policy does not become lawful simply because it arises under a contract made else-
where. When matters of public policy are involved, such as authorized wage with-
holdings, the law of the state where the contract is to be performed governs.-
Therefore, the court held that West Virginia law, not the law of Ja-
maica, would determine the enforceability of the wage withholding
provisions.'
The quoted statement from Jones seems to suggest that only when
a public policy is at issue would the law of the place of performance
govern matters of performance. In fact, a careful analysis of the Jones
opinion in its entirety reveals that the court, in the statement above,
was actually referring to what law would govern the validity of the
wage withholding provisions of the employment contract,
The court in Jones chose the lex loci contractus rule as the proper
rule for resolving the conflict of laws issue. The lex loci rule provides
that the making of a contract, its nature, validity and construction,
is governed by the law of the place where the contract was made,
but that matters bearing on the performance of a contract are gov-
erned by the law of the place of performance.
The Jones court was confronted with wage withholding provisions
which were presumably valid under the law of Jamaica, where the
contract was made. Performance pursuant to these provisions, how-
ever, was required of the defendants in West Virginia. This was not
a question of what acts would constitute performance under the with-
holding provisions; the desired mode of performance was clear. Rather,
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it was a question of whether the unambiguous withholding provisions,
valid where made, were nonetheless ineffective to create enforceable
performance obligations in West Virginia. The Jones court concluded
that if the wage withholdings were violative of West Virginia public
policy, the provisions would be unenforceable, or invalid, here.1
4
Viewed in this light, the issue in Jones was not one of performance
per se (although the court did characterize the issue as one of per-
formance), but of the validity of the contract in the place of per-
formance. Consequently, the public policy exception articulated in
Jones refers only to a discrete category of cases where the law of the
place where the contract was made will not govern the validity of the
contractual terms. This exception is consistent with the traditional no-
tions of conflict of laws principles.
C. Can New and Jones Be Reconciled?
Once this rather arduous analysis of Jones is completed, the ques-
tion becomes: "Why did the Jones court do what it did?" The decision
of the same court in New'35 only eleven months earlier, had completely
superseded the traditional rule articulated in Jones13 6 with the rule
found in section 196 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws
(1971). The New court had adopted the Second Restatement rule on
the premise that it had "no clear provision of law governing" the
conflict of laws question before it. 117 The Jones court, on the other
hand, found that the traditional law of conflicts provided adequate
guidance, 3 8 and reached its conclusion without so much as a reference
to its previous holding in New.
The Restatement rule adopted in New provides that both the va-
lidity and the obligations created by contracts for the rendition of
services are to be determined by the law of the place where the services
are to be rendered. Had the court in Jones only followed its own
decision in New, the painful path to the outcome in Jones, though
134. Id.
135. New v. TAC & C Energy, Inc., 355 S.E.2d 629 (W. Va. 1987).
136. Jones, 366 S.E.2d at 729.
137. New, 355 S.E.2d at 631.
138. Jones, 366 S.E.2d at 729.
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arriving at the same destination, would have been eased immeasurably.
The problem presented by the Jones opinion, however, is that it
creates considerable doubt regarding the proper rule of analysis for
employment contract conflict of laws analysis. Is the "traditional,"
lex loci, rule a dead letter insofar as actions on employment contracts
are concerned? The opinion in New would provide an answer in the
affirmative. The Jones opinion would compel a contrary response.
Until the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals again addresses
a conflict of laws problem in an employment contract, the correct
answer cannot be ascertained.
IV. CONCLUSION
The state of the law for the resolution of conflict of laws in West
Virginia, at least with respect to employment contracts, remains mired
in confusion. It seems clear that contracting parties can undertake to
protect themselves against this unpredictability through the use of choice
of law provisions, so long as those clauses can pass muster under the
substantial relationship scrutiny. Unfortunately, the typical employ-
ment contract is unlikely to contain such provisions. This is especially
true of those contracts implied from the unilateral promises contained
in employment handbooks or other employer representations.
When employment contracts are devoid of choice of law provi-
sions, the rule that will be applied to resolve a conflict of laws problem
that may arise in litigation is unclear. Since 1987, the West Virginia
Supreme Court has both adopted a new rule and reiterated the old.
The Second Restatement of Conflicts, section 196 rule, being concise
in format and amenable to consistent application, should be the pre-
ferred rule in this jurisdiction. However, the court's dedication to this
rule is questionable. For the time being, it is impossible to know if
conflict of laws resolution in employment contract litigation will follow
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